Starting in 1997, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission required that some firms disclose information about risks. One format for risk disclosures let firms disclose correlations by allowing firms to report the sensitivity to market risk factors of cash flows related only to financial instruments and derivatives. Prior theoretical accounting research analyzes the benchmark of voluntary disclosures to establish the effects of mandating disclosures of various types, but not disclosures of sensitivities. We propose the first theoretical model that analyzes the consequences of mandating firms to disclose their sensitivity. This model extends previous research on managers' voluntary disclosures of variances of future cash flows and measurement error of disclosures. Specifically, we derive equilibrium prices and stock returns endogenously in a setting where truthful disclosure of the sensitivity is voluntary, that is, the manager may elect to not disclose. We show that in the absence of disclosures about the sensitivities, investors require an additional risk premium. We further show that a manager's decision to disclose or withhold the sensitivity may be affected by other firms' disclosures of sensitivity even when sensitivities are uncorrelated. Finally, we show how voluntary sensitivity disclosures affect firms' cost of capital even in the limiting case with infinitely many firms. * Thursday, October 25, 2007. Preliminary and incomplete.
Introduction
While financial firms have long faced risk-based regulation, some non-financial firms also face mandatory risk disclosure requirements since January 1997 when the U.S. Reporting Release No. 48 (FRR48) . 1 FRR48 requires the disclosure of information about risks in one of three formats: sensitivity, tabular, or Value-at-Risk. If firms choose the sensitivity format, then FRR48 requires disclosure of the sensitivity to market risk factors of future cash flows related only to financial instruments and derivatives. We propose a theoretical model that facilitates analysis of the consequences of mandating firms to disclose their sensitivity.
Securities and Exchange Commission issued Financial
To do this, we follow prior theoretical accounting research and analyze the benchmark of voluntary disclosures to establish a benchmark for the effect of mandating disclosures.
An extensive literature in accounting investigates managers' disclosure incentives in the presence and absence of mandatory disclosures: Verrecchia (1983 Verrecchia ( , 1990 investigate managers' costly discretionary disclosures of future income; Dye (1990) , Penno (1996) , and Hughes and Pae (2004) investigate managers' choice and voluntary disclosure of precision; Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter (2003) characterize managers' costly discretionary disclosure of firm-specific variances.
In this paper, we analyze managers' costly discretionary disclosure of correlations in terms of sensitivity. As will be explained in more detail below, we consider a setting where firms' sensitivity disclosure under FRR48 are informative of the correlation of the firm's future cash flows with other firms' future cash flows.
We first consider a single firm setting and show that the manager has an incentive to disclose sensitivities in a symmetric interval around zero while withholding sensitivities away from zero. This means that a manager's discretionary disclosure incentives regarding variances and correlations coincide in a single firm setting. We then show that this need not extend to a setting with multiple firms. In a two firm setting where managers make their disclosure decisions sequentially, the last manager will observe the other firm's sensitivity, if disclosed, before making the discretionary disclosure decision. The last disclosing manager will condition his disclosure decision on the sensitivity previously disclosed by the other firm manager. In contrast, managers' disclosures about firm specific risk are unrelated, even when the disclosure decisions are made sequentially.
We also consider a setting with infinitely many firms. In this setting, each manager's decision whether to disclose precision will affect the firm's cost of capital.
This result contributes to current accounting papers on the relation, if any, between the distribution information in the capital markets and firm's cost of equity capital. The existing theoretical literature has not reached agreement on whether the distribution of public and private information in the economy and managers' voluntary disclosures can affect the firms' ex ante cost of equity capital. One avenue for such a link could be the real effects derived from changes in disclosure quality (see Dye (1990) , Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia (2007a,b) and Hughes, Liu, and Liu (2007) ). Hughes et al. (2007) consider the role of private and public information in the limiting case with infinitely many securities. However, none of these papers allow for managers' disclosure decisions to be discretionary.
In our modeling choices, we rely on the extensive literature in finance economics on estimation uncertainty. 2 First, firms' future cash flows are assumed to be normally distributed. This assumption implies that firms have unlimited liability and that stock prices might become negative. Second, all investors are assumed to have constant absolute risk aversion and are price takers such that investors' portfolio decisions lead to endogenously derived market-clearing prices characterized from a representative agent with aggregate risk tolerance as in Wilson (1968) . The benefit of these two assumptions is that prices exhibit the mean-variance separability in the absence of estimation risk and further market-clearing prices can be endogenously derived even in the presence of estimation uncertainty.
Third, simple factor models assume that firms' future cash flows are subject to two sources of risk: one market-wide, the other firm-specific. In the estimation risk literature, however, investors are exposed to an additional third source of risk because they do not know one or more parameters that determine the future cash flows. Instead, investors hold common prior beliefs about the distribution of the parameter. Specifically, in our setting, the unknown parameter is the sensitivity of the firm's future cash flows to the market-wide risk factor. Through costly voluntary disclosure about the sensitivity, managers can remove investors' estimation uncertainty. For firms that remove this estimation uncertainty through disclosure, investors require less of a risk premium for holding the stock. However, other firms have unfavorable news (high risk exposure characterized by extreme sensitivities) that do not make discretionary disclosure worthwhile. Rational investors anticipate what type of sensitivities would remain undisclosed and require a higher risk premium for holding such firms' stock. In summary, our paper establishes a link between managers' discretionary disclosures and firms' cost of equity capital.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 outlines current regulation that guides firms' risk disclosures; Section 3 outlines the model; Section 4 solves the benchmark case of a single firm economy; Section 5 describes the model for a two firm economy;
Section 6 describes a general multi firm economy; Finally, section 7 summarizes and outlines future research.
Regulatory Background
This paper extends our earlier article on risk disclosures where we characterized 
Model
In a related paper, Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter (2003) characterize what discretionary risk disclosure managers would make about firm-specific cash flow variance in the absence of any disclosure requirements. In their setting, managers' disclosures affect the equilibrium stock prices, equilibrium stock returns, and the firms' ex ante cost of capital when there is a finite number of firms. In this paper, managers can voluntarily make disclosures of the sensitivity of the firm's future cash flows to a common market-wide risk factor. We summarize the sequence of events in Figure 1 and the notation of our model in Table 1 . We next present the assumptions of the model.
Assumption 1 (Cash Flows):
The exchange economy includes J firms indexed by
Each firm j has a risky investment project in place that pays j X at time 2.
Variables without tilde, such as, j X , denotes the realization of the corresponding random variable j X . We assume a single market-wide factor model describes cash flow uncertainty, that is,
, where j μ is the expected cash flow, F denotes the market-wide cash flow factor, j γ~ is the firm-specific factor loading, or sensitivity of firm j's cash flows to the market-wide factor, and the firm-specific cash flow is j ε for
As is standard, we refer to F and j ε as the market-wide risk factor and the firm-specific risk for firm j, respectively. We let j P represent the market value of firm j and normalize the total supply of the j'th risky asset to one share.
Assumption 2 (Random Variables):
We assume that the market-wide factor, F , concerning the disclosure strategy that the manager has adopted rather than the manager's actual disclosure strategy. Let N denote the J-dimensional vector of these inferred disclosure strategies. If investors expect full disclosure but a manager does not disclose, investors infer the worst, that is, the investors believe that the manager observed but did not disclose the highest or lowest possible sensitivity. Finally, let ( )
denote price of firm j's shares.
To simplify the presentation, we suppress in our discussion the distinction between investors' beliefs regarding the managers' non-disclosure decision and managers' actual choice of non-disclosure. We also suppress the investors' information that determines prices.
Given the above assumptions, an equilibrium for this exchange economy is characterized by stock prices ( )
and a set of investor's optimal demand for shares,
, where asterisk superscripts indicate that these are equilibrium values. In equilibrium, market clearing must result, that is,
As a baseline case, we next show the derivation of a manager's discretionary disclosure in an economy with a single firm, where sensitivity disclosures are conceptually the same as disclosures about firm-specific variances.
Single Firm Economy
To illustrate our model, this section considers the special case where there is a single firm 1 = J and hence we suppress the firm subscript j . We let ℑ denote the investors' public information. Following Huang and Litzenberger (1988) , we consider the portfolio choice problem face by an individual investor who maximizes his expected utility 
Each investor's portfolio choice problem now reduces to: 
Prior to trading, investors will either (i) observe disclosure of γ γ = or, alternatively, (ii) observe no disclosure and infer that N ∈ = γ γ~. We consider each subgame (i) and (ii) in sequence.
(i)
Manager discloses sensitivity
If the manager decides to disclose the sensitivity, then { } ℑ ∈ = γ γ~ and the investor's certainty equivalent reduces to the familiar mean-variance form:
The first order condition for an interior solution is:
Such that the demand for shares of each investor i , 
Proposition 1 (i):
After investors observe that the manager disclosed sensitivity As expected, the market value is lower the higher the exposure to risks.
(ii) Manager does not disclose the sensitivity, investors infer that N ∈ = γ γ~.
If the manager decides to disclose the sensitivity, then, with slight abuse of notation,
In the absence of disclosure of sensitivity, each investor i chooses to maximize his certainty equivalent: 
, 0 
To characterize the manager's discretionary disclosure decision, we compare equations (6-i) and (6-ii). When the support of sensitivities are bounded, then managers will (not) make discretionary disclosures of sensitivities when the disclosure costs are sufficiently low (high). In contrast, when the support of sensitivities is unbounded, a partial disclosure equilibrium always exists. We focus on the partial disclosure equilibrium, which is characterized by one (or two) disclosure threshold(s) determined by finding the γ γ = such that the disclosure price coincides with the no disclosure price, that is, ( ) 
Proposition 2:
When J=1, the disclosure set supporting any partial disclosure equilibrium is ( )
It is intuitive that the disclosure set includes zero. Clearly, a manager who observes the most favorable news, corresponding to no exposure to the market wide risk, 0 = γ , is the most immediate candidate for disclosure. Second, the symmetry of the disclosure set is seen from the observation that (6-i) depends on the sensitivity squared.
Because we only considered a single firm economy so far, the above findings are essentially a reformulation of Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter (2003) where the manager, instead, could disclose firm specific cash flow variances. The remainder of the paper will demonstrate how sensitivity disclosures differ qualitatively from disclosures about firmspecific variances in a multi firm economy in two respects. In the next section, we show that sequential discretionary sensitivity disclosures create spill over effects between firms that disclose sensitivity early and subsequent discretionary disclosure decisions. Then in section 6, we consider the limiting case of infinitely many stocks and show that discretionary disclosures still have an effect on prices and stock returns.
Two Firm Economy
Consider the special case where there are two firms, that is, 2 = J . After substitution of initial binding budget constraint,
, each investor's terminal wealth is
The investor's expected utility optimization problem is: We can rewrite each investor i 's certainty equivalent on mean-variance separable form:
The first order conditions for an interior maximum are 2  1  1   2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  1  1  2   2  2  1  2   2  2  2  1  1  1  1  1  2  2  1 
The first order conditions for an interior solution are ( )
These first order conditions reduce to 
Limiting Case of Infinite Firm Economy
For the general case where there are J firms, the proof is parallel to what is outlined above. In the limit, as the number of firms and investors go to infinity, each firm's decision to either disclose or not disclose can make a difference. Then, for intermediate values of disclosure costs, managers with low sensitivity will disclose, while manager's with high sensitivity will withhold their information about sensitivities. Consider the case where sensitivities take one of two values, low (say zero) and high. Even in this degenerate case where non-disclosure does not carry any additional risk, still the decision to disclose or withhold information about sensitivities will affect the equilibrium price of each firm.
Summary and Future Research
This paper considers disclosures about correlations in the form of sensitivities. First, we relate disclosures about correlations to disclosures about variances. Second, we consider a sequential disclosure setting with two firms where the second manager to disclose sensitivity would prefer to disclose sensitivities that are of opposite sign of sensitivity previously disclosed by the other manager. Third, we document how discretionary disclosures about sensitivities can affect a firm's cost of equity capital even in the limiting case of infinitely many firms where firm-specific risks are perfectly diversifiable.
Consequently, managers' discretionary disclosures about correlations can affect the firm's cost of capital even though managers' disclosures about the variance of firmspecific cash flow risk, that is diversifiable, would not affect each firm's cost of capital.
The current paper was set in a stylized setting without real effects. Recent papers, including Kanodia et al. (2000) and Magee (2006) , among others, document real effect from disclosure regulation on managers' hedging, operating, and financing decisions.
Based on that literature, we would expect that one manager's discretionary disclosures of sensitivities can have spillover effects on other firms' real decisions.
Prior research on risk disclosures considers managers' discretionary disclosure of a perfect signal about the firm's risks. Yet, the models for risk measurement continue to evolve and some regulators have expressed concerns about whether we have appropriate risk measurements. 3 One possible extension would be to introduce imperfect signals about sensitivity disclosures and investigate the quality of sensitivity disclosures.
APPENDIX: Proof of Equilibrium for General Case of J>1
To analyze the general case, we need to introduce more notation. First, we use the indicator function { The terminal wealth of an individual investor is: and this investor's expected utility optimization problem is: 
